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Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860. By Lacy 
K. Ford, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Pp. xiii, 414. $39.95. 
Three fundamental problems mar this deeply researched, marvelously written study. 
First, despite the fact that he treats men in particular cases as acting out of pure 
self-interest, Lacy Ford's broader generalizations attribute cultural and ideological, not 
material, motives to them. When in 1818, for instance, the state legislature appropriated 
an amount equal to four times the normal annual state budget t~ build canals and roads 
into the South Carolina upcountry, Ford declares that "most of the criticism came from 
those who resented the state's promoting other interests more vigorously than their 
own," rather than from principled libertarian opponents of all governmental subsidies 
(p. 17). When the same body floated bonds to pay for nearly half of the construction 
costs of extending railroads into the upcountry in the 1850s, "the most adamant 
opposition" to one especially costly line, Ford remarks, "originated in those sections of 
the state which stood to gain little from the project," and repeated struggles over 
subsidies represented a "battle of selfish interests" in which critics "manipulated the 
electorate's fear of active government sponsorship of private corporations" to protect 
their "own personal or local interests" (pp. 315, 317). 
Yet these and other similarly self-interested disputes over banks, taxes, and interest 
rate ceilings, Ford asserts, convinced yeomen that civic virtue and "republican" 
independence were under attack. Fears of action by the South Carolina state govern-
ment, in turn, allowed whites to be "more easily convinced" than they would have been 
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otherwise that Lincoln and the northern Republicans represented a danger so extreme 
that by 1860 secession was the necessary response (p. 337). In the Richard Hofstadter-
David Donald "status revolution" hypothesis, abolitionists are viewed as attacking 
slavery not out of moral concerns, but to guard their social standing in the North against 
the rise of the capitalist nouveau riche. Likewise, Ford's "slave-labor republicans," 
anxious about subsidizing southern special interests, lash out at yankees who might 
meddle with slavery (p. 365). 
But why should yeomen (or abolitionists) aim at the more distant rather than the 
closer target, especially since to assault the outsider, they had to coalesce with their 
alleged enemies at home? Why should governmental favoritism to some stimulate 
general uneasiness with any governmental action at all, particularly among those who 
benefited from special state-backed privileges? Since a substantial majority of South 
Carolina white families owned slaves, and since the cotton boom of the 1850s brought 
considerable prosperity and more than doubled the average slave's price (p. 261), isn't 
the abolitionist menace to an institution in which southern whites had such a large 
material stake a sufficient and more straightforward explanation for secession? Although 
Ford does not do so, consider the counterfactuals: would South Carolina have seceded 
if there had been no Whiggish activity by the state government during the 1850s? Would 
it have seceded in 1860 if Stephen Douglas, John Bell, or John Breckinridge had won the 
presidency? What seem to me to be the obvious answers to these questions (yes and no, 
respectively) strongly imply that the struggle over who should rule at home and what the 
state government should do was much less important to secession than that of home rule 
and what the national government might do. 
The second problem is that while Ford repeatedly challenges other scholars, he never 
formulates either their or his own hypotheses clearly enough that either set of 
contentions could be falsified. What Steven Channing or William Freehling would term 
irrational fears, such as charges that the Tariff of 1828 endangered republicanism, that 
banning servitude in new territories would "enslave" South Carolina whites, or that 
southern yeomen were about to be "proletarianized," Ford makes part of a coherent 
ideology of liberty and independence, and, therefore, a rational apprehension (pp. 125, 
138, 354). What James Banner and others would see as an undemocratic polity, in which 
the malapportioned legislature, not the people, voted for the governor and for presi-
dential electors, party competition was successfully discouraged, and one man, the 
profoundly antidemocratic John Calhoun, exercised a political domination unparalleled 
in the history of any other state in the country, Ford takes to be the expression of a 
Caucasian proslavery libertarian consensus (pp. 102, 143, 173, 193, 287). What Eugene 
Genovese might treat as aristocratic speculation, investments in fledging railroads, Ford 
holds up as an example of portfolio diversification ~Y capitalist entrepreneurs out to 
"make a fast buck" (pp. 234-36, 275). Is this revisionism or name-changing? 
Third, although his simple statistical treatments of samples of socioeconomic data 
drawn from the manuscript census returns are solid and will fascinate economic 
historians, Ford abjures systematic quantitative analyses of returns in the nullification 
and 1851 secession elections, the central political events in antebellum South Carolina 
history. From the relatively low bivariate correlations (computed by other scholars) 
between support for or opposition to the Nullifiers in 1832 and various economic and 
social variables, Ford deduces that "ideological and tactical" not demographic indices, 
accounted for voting patterns (p. 137). He makes no effort to test more complex models 
himself, and he attributes any leftover, unexplained variance to unmeasured cultural 
rather than to unmeasured social or economic variables, or to observational errors. In 
his discussion of the 1851 secession/cooperation election, Ford first asserts that there 
was little correlation with slavery or with previous contests, and then, without openly 
examining any evidence at all, attributes the cooperationist victory to an alliance of 
"Whiggish entrepreneurs and yeoman" (pp. 206, 208). This traditional socioeconomic 
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interpretation, which follows Arthur Cole, is strikingly at odds with Ford's cultural 
glosses, which follow Mills Thornton, of parallel events. Ford does not comment on the 
apparent contradiction, as he does not on other elections. 
Economic and social historians would be well advised to read Ford's insightful 
treatments of self-sufficiency and the cotton-railroad boom of the 1850s in Chapters 2, 
6, and 7, but to ignore his rhetorical, illogical, and meagerly supported grandthemes. 
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